This paper uses Bayesian estimation techniques to uncover the central bank preferences of the big …ve Latin American in ‡ation targeting countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The target weights of each central bank's loss function are estimated using a medium-scale small open economy New Keynesian model with incomplete international asset markets and imperfect exchange-rate pass-through. Our results suggest that all central banks in the region place a high priority on stabilizing in ‡ation and interest rate smoothing. While stabilizing the real exchange rate is a concern for all countries except Brazil, only Mexico is found to assign considerable weight to reducing real exchange rate ‡uctuations. Overall, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru show evidence of implementing a strict in ‡ation targeting policy, whereas Chile and Mexico follow a more ‡exible policy by placing a sizeable weight to output gap stabilization. Finally, the posterior distributions for the central bank preference parameters are found to be strikingly di¤erent under complete asset markets. This highlights the sensitivity of Bayesian estimation, particularly when uncovering central bank preferences, to alternative international asset market structures.
Introduction
For many central banks in both developed and developing countries, in ‡ation targeting (IT) has become the operational monetary framework of choice to achieve price stability. 1 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see, e.g., Jahan, 2012) , since the adoption of IT by New Zealand in December 1989, there are now 28 IT central banks worldwide, of which 6 currently originate from Latin America: Brazil, Chile and Colombia all adopted IT in 1999, shortly followed by Mexico (2001) , Peru (2002) , and Guatemala (2005) (see Table 1 ). 2 While there is some empirical evidence to suggest that IT has been successful in reducing in ‡ation in developing countries (see, e.g., Batini and Laxton, 2007; Goncalves and Salles, 2008; Lin and Ye, 2009; Lee, 2011), 3 little is known about the policy preferences of central banks operating in these countries. 4 As discussed by Castelnuovo and Surico (2004) and Ilbas (2010 Ilbas ( , 2012 , such information can help in evaluating the performance of central banks, as well as improving our understanding of monetary policy actions and its e¤ects on the formation of expectations by private agents.
The aim of this paper is to use Bayesian estimation techniques to uncover and compare the central bank preferences of the big …ve Latin American in ‡ation targeting (LAIT) countries. 5 Since the IT framework can be considered as "constrained discretion" (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997), we assume that in each country monetary policy is conducted under discretion.
Each central bank is assumed to optimally set the nominal interest rate by minimizing an intertemporal quadratic loss function that includes four speci…c policy objectives: price stability via control of in ‡ation, stabilizing the output gap, reducing real exchange rate variability, and nominal interest rate smoothing. The weight attributed to each policy objective will depend on the institutional preferences of each central bank, which we can make inferences about using Justiniano and Preston (2010) , international asset markets are assumed to be incomplete such that consumption risk sharing is not perfect. Both these features have been identi…ed as empirically relevant, the more so for developing countries as in our sample.
Using the popular Random-Walk Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm, we present posterior estimates and convergence diagnostics for both the structural parameters and the persistence and standard deviations of the shocks we consider as most important in 1 See, for example, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Carare and Stone (2006) , Roger (2010) , Hammond (2011) , Jahan (2012). 2 As Table 1 reveals, there is signi…cant heterogeneity across these 6 Latin American countries in terms of the in ‡ation target set and their performance in steering actual in ‡ation towards the target. 3 Lee (2011) …nds that IT has been particularly successful in reducing in ‡ation in Colombia, while no signi…cant reductions were found for Chile. In contrast to much of the earlier literature, Brito and Bystedt (2010) …nd no evidence that IT improves economic performance in developing countries, as measured by the behavior of in ‡ation and output growth. 4 There is also some evidence to suggest that IT has reduced the dispersion of long-run in ‡ation expectations in developing countries. See Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2010) for further details. 5 We exclude Guatemala from the analysis due to the lack of reliable data.
emerging market economies (such as, among others, shocks to preferences, the risk premium, the terms of trade, and technology).
Our main …ndings are as follows. First, all …ve central banks are strongly concerned about stabilizing in ‡ation and smoothing the nominal interest rate. In particular, relative to the weight of in ‡ation stabilization, we …nd that Brazil and Peru place very high weights on interest rate smoothing. Second, there is signi…cant heterogeneity amongst the …ve central banks concerning the priorities of output gap stabilization and real exchange rate stabilization. Brazil, Colombia, and Peru show little concern for the stabilization of the output gap, whereas Chile and Mexico assign sizeable weights. While Brazil and Colombia are not concerned about real exchange rate volatility, for the remaining three countries only Mexico is found to assign a su¢ ciently high weight to minimizing real exchange rate ‡uctuations. Overall, Brazil, Colombia and Peru show evidence of implementing a strict in ‡ation targeting policy, whereas Chile and Mexico appear much more ‡exible in terms of their in ‡ation targeting preferences.
In terms of the estimated key structural parameters in ‡uencing the endogenous propagation mechanism of the model, we …nd that these are statistically reliable, economically plausible, and broadly comparable to analogous estimates for other countries available in the literature using non-Bayesian econometric methods. For example, the estimated elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is within the typical range reported in Corsetti et al. (2008) .
Furthermore, we uncover some interesting di¤erences across countries. For example, the degree of price stickiness in Brazil and Mexico is estimated to be over 3.5 times higher than in Peru.
In terms of the sources of exogenous ‡uctuations a¤ecting the …ve LAIT economies, our results indicate a high volatility (measured by the posterior mean standard deviation) for the preference shock, the risk premium shock and the terms of trade shock. The most persistent shock appears to be the risk premium shock, yet it does not dominate the persistence of some among the other shocks in each individual country. Overall, the least persistent shock in all …ve LAIT economies is the preference shock. Brazilian data. They …nd that the major concern was in ‡ation stabilization, followed by interest rate smoothing, real exchange rate stabilization and output gap stabilization.
While the estimation approach adopted in this paper is similar to Kam et al. (2009) , one important di¤erence relates to the asset market assumption used in the structural model. Kam et al. (2009) assume complete international asset markets which implies perfect risk sharing in consumption and a strong positive correlation between the real exchange rate and the marginal utilities of consumption across countries. However, there is clear empirical evidence for both de-veloped and developing economies of low consumption risk sharing across countries. 7 Moreover, Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) show that the extent of international …nancial market integration affects both the Bayesian estimates of the parameters and the transmission mechanism of shocks.
We therefore depart from Kam et al. (2009) and follow the modeling approach of Adolfson et al. (2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) in assuming incomplete international …nancial markets in addition to imperfect ERPT. 8 Furthermore, we test the sensitivity of our results to the alternative assumption of complete asset markets and show that a number of our key policy conclusions obtained under incomplete asset markets are now reversed. This is consistent with the Bayesian analysis of Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) who also …nd that the degree of model misspeci…cation depends on the asset market structure. 9 Overall, our sensitivity analysis emphasizes the dangers of using the complete asset markets assumption in Bayesian estimation, particularly when uncovering central bank prevalences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data and explains the estimation strategy. Section 4 reports our main results.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Model
This section outlines the model economy, which is based on the SOE frameworks of Monacelli 
Households
Households consume a composite of domestic C H and imported C F goods: Ra¤o (2010) . 8 Justiniano and Preston (2010) estimate the coe¢ cients of a Taylor-type monetary policy rule for the same three advanced IT economies as in Kam et al. (2009) . 9 Using Bayesian estimation of a medium-scale two-country model for the US and the Euro Area, they …nd that incomplete asset markets …ts the data better than complete asset markets, including matching the dynamics of the real exchange rate.
The parameter > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, 2 (0; 1) is the share of foreign goods in the domestic consumption bundle, and " > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of goods produced within H or F , where i; j 2 [0; 1]. The optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods yields the following aggregate demand conditions:
where the consumer price index P t is given by:
The (home) real exchange rateq t is de…ned bỹ
whereẽ t denotes the (home) nominal exchange rate. The relative price of foreign goods in terms of home goods, or the (home) terms of trade, S t , is expressed as
The representative household chooses consumption C t and labor N t to maximize expected discounted utility:
where the discount factor is 2 (0; 1), ; ' > 0 are the inverse elasticities of intertemporal substitution and labor supply, respectively, H t hC t 1 is an external habit variable with h 2 (0; 1), and g;t is a preference shock.
The household during period t supplies labor to domestic …rms receiving income from wages (2009) -the international asset market structure is assumed to be incomplete. Let B t 1 and B t 1 denote the holdings of home and foreign risk-free bonds that mature in period t with corresponding interest rates e r t and e r t . Following Justiniano and Preston (2010), we assume that there is a debt-elastic interest rate premium ! t 1 (D t 1 ; q;t 1 ) given by:
where q;t 1 is a risk premium shock and D t 1 is de…ned as the ratio of the real quantity of foreign bond holdings (expressed in terms of domestic currency) to steady state output Y ss .
If the household is a borrower (D t > 0), it must pay a premium over the interest rate. This debt-elastic interest rate premium is su¢ cient to ensure that bond holdings are stationary. 10 Consequently, the period budget constraint of the domestic household can be expressed as:
The …rst-order conditions from the households maximization problem yield:
Equation (9) is the intratemporal labor supply condition, (10) is the intertemporal consumption
Euler equation, and (11) is the interest rate parity condition.
Domestic Good Producers
The domestic goods market is comprised of a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms i 2 [0; 1] that produce di¤erentiated goods. Domestic …rms hire labor N to produce output using a linear production technology
where a;t is an exogenous domestic technology shock, and given competitive prices of labor, cost minimization yields
where M C t denotes real marginal cost.
Domestic …rms set prices according to Calvo (1983) , where in each period there is a constant probability 1 H that a …rm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, while a fraction 0 < H < 1 adjusts their prices according to the following indexation rule
where H 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of in ‡ation indexation. For simplicity, we assume that the export price of the domestic good is determined by the law of one price: P Ht = (1=S t )P H;t .
A domestic …rm i, faced with changing its price at time t, has to choose P H;t (i) to maximize its expected discounted value of pro…ts: 
The aggregate price level evolves according to:
Retail Firms
The retail market is comprised of a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms j 2 [0; 1] that import di¤erentiated goods from abroad. Similar to domestic …rms, retail …rms also set prices according to Calvo (1983) where in each period there is a constant probability 1 F that a retail …rm will be randomly selected to adjust its price. 11 Faced with changing its price at time t, a retail …rm j importing a good at costẽ t P F;t (j) chooses P F;t (j) to maximize its expected discounted value of pro…ts:
where
and F;t is a cost-push shock to import retailers. The …rst-order condition is given by:
and the aggregate price index for imports:
1 1 The parameter F governs the degree of ERPT.
Market Clearing
Goods market clearing for domestic …rms requires:
Market clearing for domestic bonds requires:
The Log-Linearized Model
The model is log-linearized around a deterministic zero-in ‡ation steady state where bond holdings are zero and the terms of trade are equal to S ss = 1. Let lowercase letters denote the log-deviations of the respective variables from their steady-state values: i.e., x t = ln(X t =X ss ).
Log-linearizing the consumption Euler equation of the domestic household (10) yields:
Log-linearizing (16) and (17) gives the aggregate supply condition for domestic goods:
where H;t = p H;t p H;t 1 and
which is obtained after combining (9), the aggregate version of (12), (13) and noting that the log-linearized version of the CPI index (4) implies p t p H;t = s t after using (6).
Log-linearizing (20) and (21) gives the aggregate supply condition for retail goods:
where F;t = p F;t p F;t 1 and the law of one price gap F;t is de…ned as:
Log linearizing equations (4)- (6) and using the above de…nition of F;t yields the following relationship for the real exchange rate and the terms of trade:
First-di¤erencing the log-linearized version of equation (6) yields:
where s;t is an exogenous terms of trade shock, and …rst-di¤erencing the log-linearized version of the CPI index (4) gives:
where t = p t p t 1 .
The real interest rate parity condition is obtained by …rst-di¤erencing (27) and combining with the log-linearized version of (11):
The disturbance term q;t captures time-varying deviations from real interest rate parity. Loglinearizing the budget constraint (8) implies: 12
where d t = log(D t ) log(ẽ t B t =Y ss P t ) is domestic-currency real foreign bond holdings (relative to steady state output). Finally, the goods market clearing condition (22) implies
We assume that the stochastic processes for preferences, technology, the terms of trade, and risk-premium follow an independent AR(1) process:
for x = g; a; s; q, and the cost-push shocks in the domestic and retail sectors follow an i.i.d. 
where v ;t ; v y ;t ; v r ;t N (0; I 3 ).
Given the speci…cation for monetary policy, the processes for { a;t , g;t , q;t , s;t } and { t ; y t ; r t } described by (33) and (34), and the cost-push shocks { H;t , F;t }, the system of equations (24)- (32) determines the following ten endogenous variables fc t ; y t , d t , q t , s t ; F;t ; r t ; t ;
H;t ; F;t g.
Central Bank Preferences
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the central bank minimizes a one-period ad-hoc quadratic loss function where monetary policy targets in ‡ation, the output gap, and interest rate smoothing. 13 In addition, following Kam et al. (2009) the central bank can also target the real exchange rate. Consequently, the loss function is given by:
The weight assigned to the annual in ‡ation rate~ t P 3 i=0 t i =4 is normalized to one and the weights y ; q ; r 2 [0; +1) represent the relative importance assigned to output gap stabilization, RER stabilization and interest rate smoothing. The loss function speci…cation given by (35) is consistent with ‡exible in ‡ation targeting as described by Svensson (1999) . Interest rate smoothing is included to capture monetary policy inertia. 14 As discussed by Svensson (2000) , the RER plays a prominent role in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in SOEs.
We further assume that the central bank minimizes (35) subject to the structural equations (24)- (32) under discretion. 15 We employ the algorithm of Dennis (2007) to compute solutions to a linear-quadratic Markov perfect equilibrium (LQ-MPE) problem. 16 Following Kam et al.
(2009), we add a noise term r;t N (0; 2 r ) to the resulting optimal interest rate rule r t ( t ; z t 1 ) to capture imperfections in the setting of interest rates (i.e., an exogenous monetary policy shock).
Estimation

Data
To estimate the model we use quarterly data for each of the …ve LAIT countries. The F oreign economy is proxied by the United States (US). All data were downloaded from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, the OECD's National Accounts, and statistical tables published by the central bank of each country. Since the LAIT countries switched to IT at di¤erent periods during the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Table 1 ), the sample period di¤ers for each country.
To remove any country-speci…c noise in the data, the …rst few years of data after the adoption 1 3 An alternative approach would be to derive an approximate welfare-based loss function using the preferences of the household. While this approach is theoretically appealing (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003; Galí, 2015) , it does not carry over easily to open economies (see, e.g., Benigno and Benigno, 2003; Monacelli, 2005) . In particular, an accurate quadratic approximation of household welfare can be obtained in open economy models only under special assumptions on household preferences and on the value of the trade elasticity parameter . 1 4 See Ilbas (2012) and McKnight and Mihailov (2015) for further discussion on the reasons behind its inclusion. 1 5 When solving (35) under discretion, the central bank treats the problem as one of sequential optimization, whereas under commitment, the central bank credibly commits to a policy plan. 1 6 For further details, see Dennis (2007) and Kam et al. (2009 v ;t ; v r ;t ; v y ;t }, 10 observable time series are needed to avoid stochastic singularity. Our data set contains the following 10 observable variables: imported goods in ‡ation denominated in domestic currency ( F;t ), the terms of trade (measured as the price of imports to exports) (s t ), the real exchange rate (computed using the nominal exchange rate de…ned as national currency per 1 USD) (q t ), domestic real GDP (y t ), domestic CPI in ‡ation ( t ), the nominal interest rate (r t ), US CPI in ‡ation ( t ), US real output (y t ), and the US federal funds rate (r t ). Consistent with the de…nition in (7), the foreign bond holdings ratio (d t ) is proxied by the real value of international reserves of each country converted into national currency by the nominal exchange rate and divided by the Hodrick-Prescott trend in output. All variables are expressed in logs and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter, except in ‡ation rates and interest rates, which are expressed in quarterly percentage change. Since monetary policy in our framework is driven using an output gap methodology, for y t we use the Hodrick-Prescott …lter to construct an output gap of deviations from the trend. As is customary in the estimation of DSGE models analysis, all variables, including those in percentage terms, are demeaned to approximate theoretical deviations from the steady state.
In order to assess whether a positive or zero weight for the real exchange rate is more probable 
Methodology and Prior Selection
The model M is estimated using Bayesian methods. 17 We update the a priori beliefs about the parameter vector , represented by the prior density p( jM ) in view of the information contained in the observed sample Y . 18 According to Bayes Theorem (see, e.g., Herbst and Schorfheide, 2016), As the posterior density (36) is derived by combining the prior density p( jM ) with the likelihood function p(Y j ; M ), the selection of priors for each parameter plays a fundamental role in Bayesian estimation. The priors used in our estimates are summarized in Table 2 . As is customary, we conform to the established conventions in selecting the prior densities: we use the beta distribution for parameters in the interval [0; 1], the inverse gamma distribution for the standard deviations of the stochastic innovations [0; 1), and the gamma distribution for the rest.
Due to limited information in the data set, some structural parameters cannot be estimated with su¢ cient precision, and were therefore calibrated prior to estimation. y , q and r are exactly the same. Consequently, any resulting di¤erences in the posterior distributions of these (as well as the other) parameters will be due to the data itself.
Results
For each of the …ve LAIT countries, Table 3 
Model Comparison, Posterior Shapes and Convergence Diagnostics
For each country, Table 3 Table 3 suggests that the central banks of Chile, Mexico and Peru are 1 9 The pseudo-code for this popular algorithm is detailed in Appendix B of Kam et al. (2009) . 2 0 These values correspond to the average quarterly share (in our whole sample, 1999:1-2014:4) of real imports of goods and services in real consumption by country. Since direct information for the latter ratio is usually not released in statistical publications, we obtained it indirectly, by the ratio of the average quarterly share of real imports of goods and services in GDP to the average quarterly share of real consumption in real GDP. explicitly concerned with stabilizing the real exchange rate. In the case of Brazil and Colombia, the results suggest that the model q = 0 is a better …t of the data in terms of having a higher marginal likelihood. 22 For the q > 0 model version, with the exception of Brazil where the acceptance rate is low, the acceptance rates obtained for Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru all fall within conventional range. 23 For each model version, Table 3 Tables 4-10 report the posterior mean and standard deviation estimates, the 95% con…dence sets for the posterior estimates, and selected diagnostic tests for MCMC convergence. As before, for Brazil and Colombia we report both model versions in the tables and for the remaining three LAIT countries we only report the q > 0 case. 25 In these tables, NSE stands for the numerical standard error, which approximates the true posterior moment as proposed by Geweke (1992) . The NSE reported for each country uses an 8% autocovariance tapered estimate.
The G p-values report the p-value associated with Geweke's (1992) chi-squared convergence 2 2 This …nding is further corroborated by the posterior densities reported in Table 3 , which are very close to zero for Brazil and Colombia in the q > 0 version of the model. 2 3 The Bayesian literature has no recommendation for a single value of an "optimal"acceptance rate. Common practice considers the range from about 20% to 50% to be the most reliable (see, e.g., Koop, 2006 , or Herbst and Schorfheide, 2016). 2 4 Results for all model versions for each country are available upon request. 2 5 Results for the q = 0 model version are available upon request.
test. 26 The last column of tables 4-10 reports the Brooks-Gelman (B-G) univariate shrink factor proposed by Gelman and Rubin (1992) and extended by Brooks and Gelman (1998) . 27 By inspection of tables 4-10, we can conclude that our estimation results are overall satisfactory.
The reported convergence test statistics for the estimated parameters indicate that in general the latter converge to an invariant distribution. 28 There are few exceptions, however, where both the Geweke chi-squared convergence test and the univariate shrink B-G factor both agree on problems with convergence: F for Brazil (for the q = 0 model); q for Chile; , F , F and s for Colombia (for the q = 0 model); H , F , a and s for Mexico; H and for Peru. 29 
Estimated Structural Parameters In ‡uencing the Endogenous Propagation
We now check if the estimated key structural parameters are economically plausible and how they compare to analogous earlier estimates.
We obtain estimates for habit persistence that are broadly consistent with the literature: We …nd little di¤erence in the estimates of price stickiness across sectors for Chile and Mexico, whereas in Peru imported price stickiness is over twice higher in the imported sector. While there is evidence of a high degree of sticky prices in the domestic economy for Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Mexico, prices are much more ‡exible in Peru. The backward-lookingness of the NKPC for home prices versus that for import prices is estimated at 0.28 versus 0.34 in Brazil, 2 6 If the Markov chain of draws has converged to a stable distribution, one would expect the means from the two halves of the generated sample to be statistically indistinguishable. The null hypothesis of the test is that the means are equal. Thus, a low p-value may indicate some evidence of problems in convergence. 2 7 This test runs the chain two or more times from a widely-dispersed starting point to see if the Markov chain always converges to the same value. Commonly, a B-G factor below 1:1 is considered as little evidence of dispersion (see, e.g., Gelman et al., 2004) . 2 8 The MCMC diagnostics …gures illustrating the convergence results discussed here are available upon request. 2 
Estimated Persistence and Volatility of the Latent Exogenous Shock Processes
We now turn to the sources of exogenous ‡uctuations in the LAIT economies, presenting our set of estimates for persistence and volatility of the structural shock processes we included in our model. 30 As it was thus far, the estimated persistence of the exogenous shock processes reveals some Brazil, the cost-push shock in the imported goods sector appears to matter too, while for Peru it is the cost-push shock in the domestic economy and the foreign in ‡ation shock that come out as sizable as well. Our estimates therefore show the importance in generating volatility of the preference shock, which we incorporated in the SOE model with incomplete asset markets as another realistic feature of the LAIT countries.
Complete versus Incomplete International Financial Markets
We now consider the role played by the assumption of incomplete international …nancial markets.
More precisely, we investigate the sensitivity of our results for the estimated policy parameters to the asset market structure. We do this by reestimating the model under the alternative assumption of complete asset markets employed in the closely-related study of Kam et al.
(2009). 31 Speci…cally, we follow Kam et al. (2009) in estimating the complete asset markets model using 9 observables (as the variable d t is now redundant) and 9 shocks (as the preference shock g;t is now omitted). The key di¤erence is that complete asset markets implies perfect risk sharing such that the real exchange rate equals the marginal rate of substitution in consumption across countries. Incomplete international …nancial markets breaks this link (see Chari et al., 2002 , and Rabanal and Tuesta, 2010). Table 11 summarizes the posterior mean and standard deviation for the central bank preferences for the two model versions, q > 0 and q = 0, estimated under complete asset markets. 32 In stark contrast with the results reported in Table 3 asset markets these conclusions are reversed. In so far that incomplete asset markets are a more realistic assumption, especially for developing countries, our analysis emphasizes the dangers of using the common complete asset markets assumption in Bayesian estimation, in our case focusing on uncovering central bank preferences.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to uncover and compare the central bank preferences of the big …ve LAIT countries using Bayesian estimation. We employed a medium-scale New Key The key insights of our analysis can be summarized as follows. The …ve LAIT economies we considered seem to fall broadly into two groups. The …rst group consists of Brazil, Colombia and Peru whose priority targets are to stabilize in ‡ation with a signi…cant degree of nominal interest rate smoothing, consistent with strict IT. The second group, Chile and Mexico, has broader policy objectives: both central banks additionally care about output gap stabilization, consistent with ‡exible IT; only Mexico further assigns a sizeable weight to reducing real exchange rate volatility. We also estimated the key structural parameters and the exogenous shocks. Our
Bayesian estimates reveal that three of the ten considered shocks drive the ‡uctuations in the LAIT economies: the risk premium shock, the terms of trade shock and the preference shock.
We test the sensitivity of our results to the alternative assumption of complete asset markets and …nd that a number of our key policy conclusions are now reversed. This suggests that the degree of model misspeci…cation depends on the asset market structure, highlighting the limitations of employing the assumption of complete asset markets in Bayesian estimation, especially when the aim is to uncover central bank preferences.
This work can be improved along various dimensions. It could be possible that preferences
were not constant over this period. Personalities of governors, in addition to the legal mandate of the institution itself, could also shape the preferences of the central bank. For future research, it would therefore be interesting to study separate subperiods in the institutional history or in governor terms of o¢ ce within a central bank, and compare across such subperiods the estimated policy preference parameters. Note: Annual in ‡ation is expressed in % per annum. Average quarterly in ‡ation is computed from the …rst quarter of the year following IT adoption through the last quarter of 2014, and is expressed as % per annum. The exchange-rate regime classi…cation is taken from IMF (2012). The in ‡ation target is extracted from Jahan (2012). 
